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WARNING TO THE PRESS: KNOCK BEFORE ENTERING
In Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. I ("Miller"), a woman was
found to have actionable claims for trespass, invasion of privacy and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress based upon her viewing of televi-
sion broadcasts depicting her (now deceased) husband. The decedent's
daughter, who did not reside with her parents, was found not to have a
cause of action for invasion of privacy or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress against the National Broadcasting Company ("NBC").
The Court of Appeal for the Second District partially reversed and par-
tially affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of NBC hold-
ing that the wife, but not the daughter, had alleged three valid causes of
action and had presented triable issues of material fact.
In late 1979 defendant television network, NBC, produced a "mini-
documentary" about the work of the Los Angeles Fire Department
Paramedic Corps.2 The series focused on the life-saving techniques of
the paramedics. To document the paramedics' on-the-job efforts, NBC
obtained permission from the Los Angeles Fire Department to accom-
pany a unit as they responded to citizen calls.3 On October 30, 1979, an
NBC film crew accompanied the paramedic unit that responded to a call
that plaintiff's husband, Dave Miller, had suffered a heart attack in the
couple's bedroom. Upon arrival at the Miller home, the film crew imme-
diately entered the bedroom where they filmed the paramedics adminis-
tering cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") to Mr. Miller.4 Plaintiff
Brownie Miller, was present at the scene, but unaware that NBC was
filming the paramedics as they tried to revive her husband. Furthermore,
she was not approached by anyone for permission to film the incident.5
The NBC crew left with the paramedics after their attempts to resusci-
1. 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1986).
2. Id. Other named defendants were NBC producer Ruben Norte and the City of Los
Angeles. The City was dismissed by stipulation. Reference to NBC includes Norte.
3. Id. at 1474, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 673. The producer, Ruben Norte, testified that "My
intent was to film and document whatever their work was and whatever it happened to be
when we filmed." He told the paramedic's media representative that he wanted to film some-
thing "dramatic." Id.
4. Id. at 1475, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 673. Norte testified that it was standard practice in the
television industry to secure consent before entering someone's home to film, but that he had
not considered the necessity for such permission when accompanying the paramedics on their
rounds. Id.
5. Id. In his deposition, Norte testified: "[T]here was a woman in the hallway, which was
outside the bedroom where the heart attack victim was. I didn't speak to her." Id. at 1475
n.4, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 674 n.4.
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tate Mr. Miller failed.6
The film obtained at the Miller home was aired in November, 1979
on an NBC news program. In addition, it was later used in a promo-
tional spot advertising the "mini-documentary." '7 In both instances, the
film was broadcast without first receiving Mrs. Miller's consent.8 On
November 19, Mr. Miller's daughter, plaintiff Mrs. Belloni, was watch-
ing the six o'clock evening news when she viewed the footage. Although
Mr. Miller's face was not shown, she knew the victim was her father
because of a distinctive tatoo on his arm. Approximately one week later,
Mrs. Miller, while watching late morning television, viewed the promo-
tional spot and recognized her husband. 9 Both women became very up-
set while viewing the footage and complained by telephone to NBC."°
Despite these complaints, NBC aired the film several more times.ll
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of NBC, con-
cluding that the causes of action stated by Mrs. Miller and Mrs. Belloni
for invasion of privacy, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress, based upon their viewing of NBC broadcasts depicting the at-
tempts to revive Mr. Miller, were meritless. The court also held that
Mrs. Miller had no cause of action for trespass since there was neither
6. Id. Mr. Miller was transported to Mount Sinai Hospital where he subsequently died.
Id. at 1475, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
7. Id. at 1474, 232 Cal. Rptr at 673. The "mini-documentary" was to run during the five
weekdays for two weeks, airing for five minutes at the end of the six o'clock evening news, and
about half that time on the eleven o'clock nightly news. The first week concerned the
paramedics' work generally. The promotional spot was to advertise the second week's focus
on the administering of CPR by a paramedic team.
8. Id. at 1475, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 673. Norte did not attempt to ascertain the identity of
the deceased's relatives because "there was no identity of the victim verbally or visually [on
film]." Mrs. Belloni, Mr. Miller's daughter, testified that Norte told her over the phone that he
didn't get permission to do the telecast because "[he] didn't think of it." Id. at 1477, 232 Cal.
Rptr. at 675.
9. Id. at 1476, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 674. Mrs. Miller viewed the film once. Mrs. Belloni,
subsequent to her initial viewing, saw one showing of a portion of the documentary for promo-
tional purposes. Id. at 1476-77, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
10. Id. at 1477, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 675. Mrs. Belloni phoned NBC (Ruben Norte) the first
time on November 19, after viewing the six o'clock evening news. The gist of the conversation
was to tell him how upset she was and ask that the film not be shown again. Norte responded
that it was part of NBC's entire week's special, but that he would look into not airing the film
again. However, it aired again that day on the eleven o'clock nightly news. Mrs. Belloni then
called NBC a second time to protest.
Mrs. Miller phoned NBC once after she viewed the footage and said: "What nerve did
you have to come into my home and invade my privacy .... My husband was a very private
person. He would never have liked anything like that to have been on television." Id. at 1476,
232 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
11. Id. at 1477, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 675. Four or five close friends, who had been advised to
keep track of promotional showings on advice of plaintiff's counsel, had seen several other
telecasts.
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evidence that NBC maliciously entered her property nor that she suffered
actual damage as a result of the entry.
12
In reviewing the trial court's decision, the court of appeal acknowl-
edged the standard of review applicable in First Amendment matters.13
While the test as to whether to grant summary judgment remains the
same in free speech cases, 14 courts impose a more stringent burden on the
party opposing the motion and require a showing of a high probability
that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits.' 5 Thus, the court
recognized that it had to evaluate the extent to which First Amendment
rights protect the news gathering techniques employed by NBC, in addi-
tion to identifying the proper causes of action available to the plaintiff.
A. Trespass: Mrs. Miller's First Cause of Action
To begin, the court of appeal relied on the common law definition of
trespass, based on an unauthorized entry onto the land of another.
16
Such an invasion is characterized as an intentional tort regardless of the
actor's motivation.' 7 Since it is undisputed that NBC made an unauthor-
ized entry into the Miller's home, the court found there was indeed a
trespass. 8 In rejecting the lower court's determination that there was no
trespass since NBC had not maliciously entered the property, the court
of appeal focused on the word "intentional" in the sense that the law
understands and uses it. Specifically, NBC intended to cross the thresh-
old of the Miller home,' 9 and therefore, committed an intentional tort,
regardless of its motivation or intention.2 °
Turning to the issue of damages, the court held that under Califor-
nia law, the "consequences" flowing from an intentional tort, such as
trespass, may include emotional distress.2 ' Thus, NBC could be liable
for any resulting anguish experienced by Mrs. Miller when NBC broad-
12. Id. at 1473-74, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
13. For purposes of discussion, "First Amendment rights" refers collectively to the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I section 2 of the California
Constitution.
14. The test is whether there is a triable issue of fact presented in the case. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 437(c) (West Supp. 1987).
15. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1479, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
16. Id. at 1480, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1481, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (citing Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal.
2d 328, 353 P.2d 294, 5 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1960)).
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cast her husband's dying moments.22
B. Invasion of Privacy: Mrs. Miller's Second Cause of Action
In addressing the invasion of privacy claim, the court looked to
Dean Prosser's classic 1960 article on the categorization of privacy inter-
ests," concluding that the case at hand involved the first category of
rights-the right to be secure from intrusion.24 More explicit is the Re-
statement of Torts, section 652B setting forth the parameters for the
court's analysis, 25 stating, "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. "26
Before the court could decide whether Mrs. Miller had an actiona-
ble claim for intrusion, it had to make a preliminary determination of
"offensiveness." ' 27 Turning to California case law, the court found little
assistance since cases based on facts showing actual physical intrusion
were scarce. The court deduced that this was probably because widely
held notions of decency preclude individuals from entering private homes
without the consent of those living there.28 Despite this lack of assist-
ance, the court went on to list several factors to be considered in deter-
mining "offensiveness." These factors included the degree of intrusion;
the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion; the
intruder's motives and objectives; the setting into which he intrudes; and
the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded. 29 The Miller court
did not expound on the interplay between the facts of the case and these
factors. Instead, the court concluded independently that reasonable peo-
ple could construe NBC's intrusion into the Millers' bedroom, at a time
of vulnerability and confusion, as a lack of restraint and sensitivity rising
to the level of "highly offensive conduct."3 °
22. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1481, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
23. Id. at 1482, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 678. Prosser categorized and defined four basic privacy
interests as follows: (1)Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs. (2)Public disclosure of embarrasing private facts about the plaintiff. (3)Publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. (4)Appropriation, for the defend-
ant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383
(1960).
24. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1482, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)).
27. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1483, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
28. Id. at 1483, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79.
29. Id. at 1483-84, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
30. Id. at 1484, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
[Vol. 8
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The court of appeal then considered the potential for damages for
such an intrusion. In finding that damages flowing from an invasion of
privacy logically would include an award for mental suffering, the court
relied on Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co.,3 which held
that special damages need not be charged or proven, and, if the proof
discloses a wrongful invasion of the right to privacy, substantial damages
for mental anguish alone could be recovered. Giving full weight to Fair-
field, the Miller court concluded that all the consequences and events
flowing from NBC's trespass could be subject to legitimate inquiry by a
jury.32 In so holding, the court of appeal stated that the lower court, in
granting summary judgment in favor of NBC on Mrs. Miller's causes of
action for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, mistakenly relied on Flynn v. Higham .3 The Flynn court held that
the right to privacy is purely personal and dies with the person. 34 The
trial court's error was in finding that Mrs. Miller's causes of action were
"relational," based on her relation to Mr. Miller, and not personal. The
court of appeal pointed out that the Miller home belonged to the couple,
and consequently, the uninvited NBC crew invaded Mrs. Miller's rights
directly and personally.35
31. 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955).
32. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1485, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
33. 149 Cal. App. 3d 677, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1983), cert. denied, Feb. 15, 1984. In Flynn,
the complaint alleged that the defendants, the author and publisher of "Errol Flynn-The
Untold Story," defamed plaintiffs, children of the deceased Errol Flynn, by writing that their
father was a homosexual and a Nazi spy. In affirming the order of dismissal after demurrer
was sustained and plaintiffs failed to amend their complaint, the court included the following
discussion:
It is well settled that the right of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be as-
serted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded, that is,
plaintiff must plead and prove that his privacy has been invaded. Further, the right
does not survive but dies with the person. It is clear that the publication must con-
tain some direct reference to the plaintiff. The publication must invade the plaintiff's
privacy. Where the publication was directed at another individual and referred inci-
dentally to the plaintiff but was not directed at him, no recovery can be had. Where
the plaintiff's only relation to the asserted wrong is that he is a relative of the victim
of the wrongdoer and was unwittingly brought into the limelight, no recovery can be
had.
187 Cal. App. 3d at 1485, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (citations omitted).
34. To support its position, the court quoted Nelson v. Main Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1225
(1977): "[Ihf actions for violating the right of privacy are allowed by other than the person
directly involved, fixing their boundaries and parameters would become an almost impossible
task. For example, within what degree of relationship, if any, must a prospective plaintiff be?"
Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1486, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
35. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1486-87, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
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C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Mrs. Miller's Third
Cause of Action
The court began by identifying the elements of a prima facie case of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.36 In evaluating the conduct of
NBC, the court employed the reasonable person standard.37 NBC's tres-
pass, committed with little or no thought to its obvious transgression,
was crucial to finding that NBC had acted in reckless disregard of the
rights and sensitivities of others.38 The court of appeal was also troubled
by NBC's apparent lack of sensitivity to Mrs. Miller's protests of the film
being aired.39 Reiterating that Mrs. Miller's home was invaded without
her consent and her dying husband's last moments filmed and broadcast
to the world, the court left it to a jury to decide whether NBC's conduct
was outrageous.' In finding a legal basis for Mrs. Miller's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court emphasized that
"[i]t was immaterial that in NBC's judgment the body of Mr. Miller was
not identifiable by the average viewer. Mrs. Miller was not an average
viewer. The film depicted her house and her husband, and that fact was
known to her."41
D. Mrs. Belloni's Causes of Action
In affirming the trial court's holding that Mrs. Belloni had not
stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy or for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the court of appeal once again addressed Flynn
v. Higham. 42 It found that because the principle thrust of Mrs. Belloni's
claims was her relationship to her parents who were victimized by NBC's
outrageous conduct, rather than NBC's conduct toward her, her claims
fell within the policy limitations set out in Flynn.43 The determining fac-
tor was that, unlike her mother, Mrs. Belloni was not present during the
invasion of the Miller home.' The court declined to accept Mrs. Bel-
36. Id. "(l)extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of caus-
ing, or reckless disregard [for] the probability of causing emotional distress; (2)the plaintiff's
suffering severe or extreme distress; and (3)actual and proximate causation of the emotional
distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." Id. (citing Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24
Cal. 3d 579, 595 P.2d 975, 156 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1979)).
37. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1487, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
38. Id. at 1487, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82.
39. Id. at 1488, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 149 Cal. App. 3d 677, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1983). Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1489,
232 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
43. See supra note 34.
44. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1489, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
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loni's argument that the broadcasts into her home of her father's dying
moments in and of themselves constituted "photographic intrusions,"
thereby falling within the ambit of invasion of privacy by intrusion.4"
E. First Amendment Rights
Lastly, the court addressed NBC's vigorous defense that its First
Amendment right to gather news relieved them of liability. Initially, the
court recognized that "[i]ntrusion does not raise [F]irst [A]mendment
difficulties since its perpetration does not involve speech or other expres-
sion. It occurs by virtue of the physical or mechanical observation of the
private affairs of another, and not by the publication of such observa-
tions."46 Nevertheless, the court went on to explore NBC's contention
since both physical observation of the private affairs of another and the
filming and dissemination of the observation were involved.47
Looking to both the Federal and California Constitutions, the court
found ample support for the right of individuals to be "let alone."'48
Likewise, it recognized that the protection afforded news persons has
been perceived throughout United States history as of the utmost impor-
tance in maintaining a free society.49 But assuming that public education
about paramedics and CPR qualifies as news, the court insisted that con-
stitutional protection for news gathering is limited rather than absolute.5"
The First Amendment, the court emphasized, has "never been construed
to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1490, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 683. (citing Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to
Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV.
935, 957 (1968)).
47. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1490, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
48. Borrowing from Gallela v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court noted
that the individual's right to be let alone permeates the Federal Constitution in a number of
different ways. "The First Amendment protects the right of freedom of association. The
Fourth Amendment protects the individual from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Fifth Amendment and its privilege against self-incrimination safeguards the individual in a
zone of privacy into which the Government may not intrude, and the Ninth Amendment
provides that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1490, 232 Cal.
Rptr. at 683. (quoting Gallela, 353 F. Supp. at 231).
The California Constitution provides that "[a]ll people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life, and liberty, acquir-
ing, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I § I.
49. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1491, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
50. Id. at 1492, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
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course of news gathering."5
The court of appeal concluded that the obligation not to make unau-
thorized entry onto the private premises of individuals like the Millers
does not place an impermissible burden on newsgatherers; nor is it likely
to have a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.5 2
Emphasizing again that others beside the media have rights, the court of
appeal held that in the context of the events at the Miller home on Octo-
ber 30, 1979, those personal rights must prevail.
53
The court of appeal refused to uphold the summary judgment in
favor of NBC as to Mrs. Miller since it found that she had stated causes
of action and there were triable issues of material fact. It is obvious that
the court was strongly sympathetic to Mrs. Miller and the unfortunate
circumstances surrounding this litigation. First, it prefaced its opinion
with the remark that the designation and form of the complaint are im-
material in determining what causes of action are stated by the facts as
pleaded.54 With that in mind, the court went on to disregard some of the
plaintiff's more plausible theories of recovery55 and identified its own
causes of action. Second, the court went to great lengths to describe the
tragedy Mrs. Miller suffered and the apparent lack of sensitivity NBC
showed for her plight.5 6 Third, the court stated it was mindful that
NBC's First Amendment rights were a principle issue in the case. It
went on, however, to give them only cursory review in holding that Mrs.
Miller's rights prevailed. The overall result was a decision that extends
the law of trespass and confuses the developing law of privacy invasion.
By interchanging theories of "trespass," "intrusion" and "intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress," the court allowed Mrs. Miller to recover
for the harm she suffered as a result of NBC's publication-a conse-
quence of the entry which itself did not directly cause Mrs. Miller harm.
The court of appeal's analysis of Mrs. Miller's claim of trespass was
straightforward and uncomplicated,57 relying simply on common law
and common sense. Since it was undisputed that NBC entered the Miller
home without consent, its entry fell squarely within the definition of tres-
51. Id. at 1492, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (citing A.A. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,
249 (9th Cir. 1971).
52. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1492-93, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
53. Id. at 1493, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
54. Id. at 1479, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (citing 4 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, § 367
at 420 (3d ed. 1985)).
55. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1471 n.2, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71 n.2.
56. Id. at 1474-1478, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 673-75.
57. Id. at 1480-81, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
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pass-an unauthorized entry.5" Since there was no question that NBC
intended to cross the Millers' threshold, by definition, they committed an
intentional tort.59 The court's reasoning was logical and rested on basic
principles well grounded in trespass law.
The court then turned to the issue of damages. Unquestionably,
Mrs. Miller should recover for any damage proximately caused by injury
or interference with her possessory rights at the time of the trespass.
60
The court goes further, however, to state that NBC may be liable for the
"consequences" that flow from its trespass. Such "consequences" would
include emotional distress neither accompanied by a physical injury to
person or land. 61 Accordingly, the court of appeal held that NBC could
be held liable for Mrs. Miller's anguish when it broadcast her husband's
dying moments. The court cites Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert, 62 for
this proposition. This results however, in an extension of Acadia's hold-
ing that undoubtedly the Acadia court did not intend.
In Acadia, the malicious shutting off of plaintiff's water supply
caused his wife's relapse into mental illness requiring extensive medical
care and hospitalization. The court reasoned that the "[d]efendant's dis-
ruption [was] closely analogous to a trespass ... in that it interfered with
the use and enjoyment of the land by [plaintiff] and his wife, and such
conduct warrants liability for mental distress ... at least where ... the
tortious acts are wilfuL,, 63 Subsequent cases have interpreted Acadia as
allowing recovery for emotional distress only where intentional and out-
rageous conduct is found.64
Although it relied on Acadia, the Miller court's analysis under tres-
pass never identified NBC's entry as extreme or outrageous. The court's
finding that the entry was intentional is not sufficient, particularly since
the court acknowledged that "[NBC's] more refined motivation or inten-
tions [were] immaterial" 65 in making that determination. As Prosser and
58. Id. at 1480, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
59. Id.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 (1965).
61. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1481, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 677. Note however, there appears
to be a typographical error in the opinion published in 187 Cal. App. 3d. The word "either"
should be "neither" as it appears in 232 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
62. Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 5 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1960).
63. Id. at 338, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 692 (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963) (disapproved on other grounds in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968)) (disallowing recovery for emotional distress where there was no proof of wilful conduct
and distinguishing Acadia, as an action involving wilful conduct); Fuentes v. Perez, 66 Cal.
App. 3d 163, 136 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1977).
65. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1480, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
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Keeton have explained, "[the rule for extreme misconduct is that] con-
duct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature
which is especially calculated to cause ... mental distress of a very seri-
ous kind."6 6 Without a definitive finding of outrageous conduct, the
court eliminates a crucial factor in the Acadia formula for recovery. This
omission leads to the proposition that "mere intent" to enter the prop-
erty of another is sufficient to justify damages for emotional distress.
It is doubtful that Acadia supports this broad proposition. In order
to conclude that Mrs. Miller could recover under a theory of trespass,
the Miller court was obliged to find that NBC's entry constituted ex-
treme and outrageous conduct. Furthermore, it is an established princi-
ple in the law of trespass that the recoverable damage must be
proximately caused by injury or interference with the possessory rights of
the owner at the time of the trespass.67 For example, in Acadia, the tres-
pass included the act of turning off the water, an act which caused the
mental suffering of the plaintiff. Miller, however, is a somewhat different
situation. In Miller, the trespass included the act of filming, an act which
did not cause the mental suffering of Mrs. Miller. In addition, there was
no showing of interference with her possessory rights since she was una-
ware of NBC's presence on the night her husband died.6" Lastly, since
the tort of trespass is designed to protect interests in possession of prop-
erty, damages for trespass should be limited to consequences (including
emotional distress) flowing from interference with possession and not for
separable acts more properly allocated under other categories of
liability.
69
For example, in Costlow v. Cusimano, 7' defendants published a story
which included photographs of plaintiffs' deceased children who had suf-
focated when they trapped themselves in a refrigerator located in the
family home. The photographs were taken when defendants trespassed
into the plaintiffs' home. The court held that "[t]here is no support for
plaintiffs' argument that damages ... for emotional disturbance are re-
coverable on the alleged facts as the natural consequence of the tres-
pass .... [T]he harm arose as a consequence of acts performed after the
trespass."71 Analogously, Mrs. Miller's anguish arose from the broad-
cast of her husband's last moments which occurred weeks after the tres-
66. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 12, at 60 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis
added).
67. See supra note 60. (emphasis added).
68. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1476, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
69. See e.g. Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 A.D.2d 196, 198, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 97 (1970).
70. 34 A.D.2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1970).
71. Id. at 198, 311 N.Y.S. 2d at 97.
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pass. As stated above, the actual filming which occurred on the Miller
property did not cause Mrs. Miller any distress. Thus, recovery for any
damage would best be reviewed under invasion of privacy.
It is the court's analysis of privacy invasion, however, that is most
confusing. Initially, the court recognized four distinct branches of pri-
vacy interests.7 2 It then went on to determine that the right to be free
from intrusion is involved in the Miller case. In finding that Mrs. Miller
had suffered an invasion, the court found that "reasonable people could
regard the NBC camera crew's intrusion . . . as highly offensive con-
duct," thus meeting the limitation imposed by the Restatement.73
Although it is obvious that NBC's entry into the Miller home was a
technical trespass, it is debatable whether it constitutes an actual intru-
sion as to Mrs. Miller. To be sure, had NBC filmed her reaction to the
tragic events, such as bending over her husband's body, crying, or clutch-
ing others for comfort, the camera would indeed have intruded into a
very private moment of her own.74 But nothing of the sort happened.
Mrs. Miller remained in another room and was oblivious to NBC's pres-
ence.75  Regardless, the court was not unreasonable in holding that
NBC's trespass also constituted the tort of intrusion.76 Certainly, NBC's
entry into Mrs. Miller's home alone, irrespective of who was filmed,
could be regarded as "highly offensive conduct" by a jury. This determi-
nation does square with the rule that the right of privacy is a purely
personal right.77 No longer is management and control of property
vested only in the husband.78 Under present law, a wife possesses in-
dependent and coequal authority of commonly occupied areas.79 As the
Miller court pointed out, "[t]he NBC crew ...not only invaded the
Miller's bedroom without Dave Miller's consent, they also invaded the
72. See supra note 23 regarding the four branches of privacy invasion.
73. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1484, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
74. See Respondent's California Supreme Court Brief at 23, Miller v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1986) (hereinafter Respondent's Brief).
75. The author considers this argument not to be without some logic, but emotionally
finds it a difficult one to make.
76. See Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co. 319 So. 2d 100 (1975).
77. See supra note 33.
78. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1486, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 681. "In the context of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure law as applied in a criminal case, the California Supreme
Court has observed that former case law had reflected 'the now defunct community property
principle that management and control of real and personal property are vested in tl.! husband
(Former Civ. Code, §§ 162a, 172a, repealed by Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 3, p. 3313). Under
present law a wife possesses independent and coequal authority to consent to a search of com-
monly occupied areas. (See Civ. Code, § 5105.)' (People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 841, 857,
fn. 5 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P. 2d 776].)" Id.
79. See supra note 78.
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home ... of his... wife." 8 Thus, NBC's intrusion would be direct and
personal to Mrs. Miller.
While this reasoning is sound, the court's discussion of damages is
unnecessarily confusing. By defining NBC's activity as "intrusion," but
permitting the recovery of damages caused by Mrs. Miller's reaction to
the publication of private facts about her husband, the court seemingly
melds two distinct branches of the invasion of privacy tort-intrusion
and publication. Seizing upon the circumstances under which the foot-
age was obtained, the court characterized Mrs. Miller's damage, suffered
several weeks later, as derivative of the entry into her home rather than
of the publication which actually caused her distress.81 This characteri-
zation allowed the court to avoid a potential barrier to Mrs. Miller's
recovery.
Since the gravamen of Mrs. Miller's claims was the publication of
the film depicting her husband, and not the trespass, the rule forbidding a
relational right to privacy,82 (the same rule that precluded Mrs. Belloni's
recovery) should come into play, potentially immunizing NBC from lia-
bility. Approaching the cause of action as an intrusive trespass with lia-
bility for all consequences flowing from it, the court of appeal was
allowed to avoid the relational rights doctrine of Flynn that the trial
court felt bound by.83
Hinging Mrs. Miller's recovery on NBC's entry is troublesome for
two reasons. First, it appears that the court was, in reality, trying to find
a way for Mrs. Miller to recover for the publication because she suffered
no harm from the intrusion. Assuming this was the case, there is no
reason why Mrs. Belloni should not have been allowed to recover.84 Her
absence from the scene is a distinction without substance. Like her
mother, she suffered no harm at the time of the intrusion but did suffer
weeks later when she viewed the publication. If the court wants to side-
step the "no relational rights doctrine," it should do so for both Mrs.
Miller and Mrs. Belloni.
Second, in striving to help Mrs. Miller recover, the court seems to
merge intrusion and publication under one common analysis. Worse yet,
it does so by completely sacrificing the common law standards applicable
to a cause of action under the branch of publication85 and addressing
80. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1486, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
81. Respondent's Brief, supra note 74, at 8-9.
82. See supra note 33.
83. See Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1485-86, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 680-81.
84. See supra notes 42, 44 and accompanying text.
85. The court gave no consideration to NBC's state of mind in regards to the airing of the
film, or the constitutional privilege of newsworthiness applicable in actions based on a publica-
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only those applicable to intrusion. Again, relying on the trespass, the
court found that any First Amendment issues were subject to A.A.
Dietemann v. Time.86 In Dietemann, the court held that "[t]he First
Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity
from torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The
First Amendment is not a license to trespass . . . 87
Most troublesome, however, is that the resulting inconsistencies and
confusion are completely unnecessary. Although the court was allowing
recovery based on publication, it was not necessary for the "relational"
right of privacy to be at issue or for damages based on publication to ride
the coat tails of NBC's intrusive trespass. At the beginning of this analy-
sis, it was pointed out that the court was obviously sympathetic to Mrs.
Miller.88 However, in its eagerness to find some basis under which Mrs.
Miller could recover, the court rejected the cause of action originally
pleaded in her complaint;89 the insistence that the publication of her dy-
ing husband's photograph during her time of grief, was the invasion of
her privacy-an intrusion on her solitude-not merely a consequence of
the intrusion that occured when NBC entered her home.
Whether Mrs. Miller, or Mrs. Belloni for that matter, could recover
would then depend on two questions.90 First, did the media lawfully ac-
quire the picture it published? Second, was the account of the death,
accompanied by the picture, the legitimate reporting of news?9" Natu-
tion. This, naturally, is the core of respondent's defense. See Respondent's Brief, supra note
74, at 11-20.
86. A.A. Dietemann v. Time Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
87. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1492, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (citing A.A. Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (1971) (emphasis original)).
88. See supra note 56.
89. See supra note 55.
90. This approach was proposed in the appellant's brief. See Appellant's California
Supreme Court Brief at 29-30, Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463,
232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1986) (hereinafter Appellant's Brief).
91. The appellants illustrate this approach as follows:
[A]ttention is first directed to Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304,
95 P.2d 491 (1939). The plaintiff's wife committed suicide by leaping from one of
the tallest buildings in Los Angeles. The Examiner published her picture, which it
had legitimately acquired .... Although publication of that picture and the account
of her death undeniably exacerbated the grief which her bereaved husband was ex-
periencing, no invasion of privacy was found because the newspaper had lawful pos-
session of her picture and the story Was legitimate news.
By way of contrast, attention is now directed to Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital,
171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930). A child was born with its heart outside its body-
unquestionably, "news." Rushed to the hospital and operated on, it nevertheless
died. The hospital authorities summoned the press, which photographed and then
published pictures of the child's body. Held, a cause of action by the parents was
stated (emphasis original).
Where lies the distinction? In the legitimacy of the acquisition of the offending
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rally, under this analysis, the court will ultimately turn to the trespass to
determine whether the photograph was lawfully required. But an impor-
tant distinction is made. Under this analysis, there is no recovery for
publication under the separate branch of privacy invasion-intrusion.
This approach makes it clear that publicity is not the issue. What is
involved, rather, are two separate intrusions: when NBC entered the
Miller home to film and when it telecast Mr. Miller's dying moments,
without consent or warning, into the home of his loved ones.
Moreover, this approach lends itself well to the court of appeal's
analysis of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In evaluating
NBC's conduct, the court found its trespass to be in reckless disregard of
the sensitivities of others,92 and left it up to a jury to decide whether its
conduct rose to the level of outrageousness. But the court further
stressed that it was troubled by NBC's lack of sensitivity to the protests
of Mrs. Miller and by the broadcast of Mr. Miller's last moments.93
Akin to this language is the argument that the unsanctioned broadcasts,
in and of themselves, constituted an intrusion.
In sum, although the court of appeal's decision unnecessarily ex-
tends the law of trespass and confuses the developing law of privacy inva-
sion, it creates no doubt or confusion regarding the message that it sends
out to newsgatherers: The First Amendment cannot be used as a shield
against liability for tortious misconduct. As the court emphasized,
others beside the media have rights. "To hold otherwise might have ex-
traordinarily chilling implications for all of us; instead of a zone of pri-
vacy protecting our secluded moments, a climate of fear might surround
us instead." 94
Michelle Houret
photograph. The hospital authorities had no right to let the press photograph the
deceased child .... Since the picture had not been lawfully acquired, its publication
was actionable.
Appellant's Brief at 29-30.
92. See supra note 38.
93. See supra note 39.
94. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1493, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
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